Before I say what I have to say, I would like readers to watch this short video clip:
The speaker must be known to many of you, but that is irrelevant, for he is not the only who does what I am about to point out.
And I am not going to talk about whether marches and protests are put together by godless socialists (as he calls them) or not. Nor am I going to talk about the cameras of secret services that, according to him, take shots of protesters' faces, even of the iris inside their eyes, and record patterns of their voices.
I am concerned with the things he says in the name of religion. I am concerned with his unequivocal "No" that he attributes to Islam in response to a question concerning the permissibility of protests. I am concerned that he says protests and marching through the streets is for people who are weak in their faith, and then makes a fallacious reference to a ḥadīth to buttress his claim. I am concerned how he says protesting is the way of kuffār, because that is essentially a religious claim.
Does the piece of Islamic evidence (i.e. the ḥadīth) he has cited really support his claims? Let's see!
Muslim has recorded the report of Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī that Muhammad (may peace and God's blessings be upon him) said,
The speaker cites this ḥadīth right after saying that protesting is for those who are weak in their faith, which implies that protesting is equivalent to merely condemning an evil in one's heart. Really? Is protesting merely condemning an evil in one's heart? I am afraid, it is not. It takes a person a lot of courage to participate in a protest and march through the streets, especially if it is in one of those countries where voices of dissent are brutally gagged. It means one is willing to take the risk of being recorded by the cameras of powerful secret services – a risk that the respected speaker thinks is not worth taking. That is clearly more than condemning evil in one's heart alone.
The speaker goes on to assign certain meanings to parts of the ḥadīth. Thus, he says changing an evil state by hand does not mean fighting, burning, looting, and throwing rocks – which he thinks protests are all about. Instead, he says changing an evil state by hand means to engage in some "industry", to "get involved", to become "socially active", to use one's heart, and to "spill some blood". Does the phrase in the ḥadīth really exclude protests (represented as fighting, burning, looting, and throwing rocks by the speaker) from its meaning, but allows being understood as engaging in some industry, getting involved, becoming socially active, using one's heart, and spilling some blood? No, indeed!
Similarly, he says seeking to change an evil state by one's tongue does not mean marching and shouting (as in protests). Instead, he says it means we should choose a representative who would speak on our behalf. Again, does the text of the ḥadīth lend to this kind of argument? No, it does not.
The fact is that the speaker's use of this ḥadīth is absolutely fallacious. The text of the ḥadīth does not at all preclude protests as one of the ways in which one's effort to change an evil state might manifest. Seeking to change evil states by hand or by tongue covers all kinds of practical efforts, including protests.
Such fallacious reference to Qur'an and ḥadīth is not uncommon. Why would people do that?
Speakers and authors sometimes refer to an āyah or a ḥadīth because that makes their argument look more authentic. People are likely to take them more seriously. Most lay persons do not see such flaws in an argument. So long as they hear an āyah of Qur'an or some ḥadīth, they would readily believe that the proposed idea is legitimately "Islamic".
Frail references to Qur'an and ḥadīth are also made out of a genuine desire to seek guidance from God's word and recorded practice of the Messenger. In itself, the desire to seek guidance from Qur'an and the Messenger's practice is praiseworthy. The problem occurs when we try to extort guidance when it's not there. Thus, when Qur'an and the recorded practice of the Messenger do not explicitly address an issue, we still try to find āyāt and aḥādīth that might be remotely connected to the matter. In the process, we stretch Qur'anic āyāt and aḥādīth too far. What comes out of this exercise is a flawed argument – an "Islamic" view that is marginally or not at all Islamic.
Instead of trying to spot āyāt and aḥādīth that are remotely (if at all) connected to a matter, it would be so much more useful if we admitted the absence of specific guidance in Qur'an and ḥadīth (when such is the case), and made use of natural/social scientific research tools to find out answers and solutions that are consistent with Islam, though not warranted by Qur'an and ḥadīth. In this way, Muslims would also contribute more significantly to advancement of human thought.
In the case of protests, for example, it would be so much more useful if we referred to experience of various communities with different forms of protest, instead of advancing a fallacious argument from ḥadīth (and inviting critics thereby to ridicule religion). I believe a whole lot of research would already be available that examines different ways of expressing political dissent, which of those ways have proven more useful than others, and what are the advantages and limitations of each of the ways in which people have raised their voices in recent past.
I believe tools of natural/social scientific and historical research can provide useful bases for ongoing legislation, just as humanly-conceived juristic tools (qiyās, istiḥsān, istiṣlāḥ, sadd al‑dharī‘ah etc.) of the past did. We need to explore and exploit the potential of contemporary research tools in informing policy and guiding legislation in matters that are not specifically addressed by Qur'an and authentic records of the Messenger's practice. Human solutions based on rigorous research are more likely to be useful than marginally Islamic views that result from stretching Qur'an and ḥadīth too far.
The speaker must be known to many of you, but that is irrelevant, for he is not the only who does what I am about to point out.
And I am not going to talk about whether marches and protests are put together by godless socialists (as he calls them) or not. Nor am I going to talk about the cameras of secret services that, according to him, take shots of protesters' faces, even of the iris inside their eyes, and record patterns of their voices.
I am concerned with the things he says in the name of religion. I am concerned with his unequivocal "No" that he attributes to Islam in response to a question concerning the permissibility of protests. I am concerned that he says protests and marching through the streets is for people who are weak in their faith, and then makes a fallacious reference to a ḥadīth to buttress his claim. I am concerned how he says protesting is the way of kuffār, because that is essentially a religious claim.
Does the piece of Islamic evidence (i.e. the ḥadīth) he has cited really support his claims? Let's see!
Muslim has recorded the report of Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī that Muhammad (may peace and God's blessings be upon him) said,
من رأى منكم منكرا فليغيره بيده فإن لم يستطع فبلسانه فإن لم يستطع فبقلبه وذلك أضعف الإيمان.
"Whoever among you witnesses an evil state, he should [seek to] change it by his hand; if he cannot do so, then by his tongue; if he cannot do that either, then in his heart, and that is the weakest of īmān."
The speaker cites this ḥadīth right after saying that protesting is for those who are weak in their faith, which implies that protesting is equivalent to merely condemning an evil in one's heart. Really? Is protesting merely condemning an evil in one's heart? I am afraid, it is not. It takes a person a lot of courage to participate in a protest and march through the streets, especially if it is in one of those countries where voices of dissent are brutally gagged. It means one is willing to take the risk of being recorded by the cameras of powerful secret services – a risk that the respected speaker thinks is not worth taking. That is clearly more than condemning evil in one's heart alone.
The speaker goes on to assign certain meanings to parts of the ḥadīth. Thus, he says changing an evil state by hand does not mean fighting, burning, looting, and throwing rocks – which he thinks protests are all about. Instead, he says changing an evil state by hand means to engage in some "industry", to "get involved", to become "socially active", to use one's heart, and to "spill some blood". Does the phrase in the ḥadīth really exclude protests (represented as fighting, burning, looting, and throwing rocks by the speaker) from its meaning, but allows being understood as engaging in some industry, getting involved, becoming socially active, using one's heart, and spilling some blood? No, indeed!
Similarly, he says seeking to change an evil state by one's tongue does not mean marching and shouting (as in protests). Instead, he says it means we should choose a representative who would speak on our behalf. Again, does the text of the ḥadīth lend to this kind of argument? No, it does not.
The fact is that the speaker's use of this ḥadīth is absolutely fallacious. The text of the ḥadīth does not at all preclude protests as one of the ways in which one's effort to change an evil state might manifest. Seeking to change evil states by hand or by tongue covers all kinds of practical efforts, including protests.
Such fallacious reference to Qur'an and ḥadīth is not uncommon. Why would people do that?
Speakers and authors sometimes refer to an āyah or a ḥadīth because that makes their argument look more authentic. People are likely to take them more seriously. Most lay persons do not see such flaws in an argument. So long as they hear an āyah of Qur'an or some ḥadīth, they would readily believe that the proposed idea is legitimately "Islamic".
Frail references to Qur'an and ḥadīth are also made out of a genuine desire to seek guidance from God's word and recorded practice of the Messenger. In itself, the desire to seek guidance from Qur'an and the Messenger's practice is praiseworthy. The problem occurs when we try to extort guidance when it's not there. Thus, when Qur'an and the recorded practice of the Messenger do not explicitly address an issue, we still try to find āyāt and aḥādīth that might be remotely connected to the matter. In the process, we stretch Qur'anic āyāt and aḥādīth too far. What comes out of this exercise is a flawed argument – an "Islamic" view that is marginally or not at all Islamic.
Instead of trying to spot āyāt and aḥādīth that are remotely (if at all) connected to a matter, it would be so much more useful if we admitted the absence of specific guidance in Qur'an and ḥadīth (when such is the case), and made use of natural/social scientific research tools to find out answers and solutions that are consistent with Islam, though not warranted by Qur'an and ḥadīth. In this way, Muslims would also contribute more significantly to advancement of human thought.
In the case of protests, for example, it would be so much more useful if we referred to experience of various communities with different forms of protest, instead of advancing a fallacious argument from ḥadīth (and inviting critics thereby to ridicule religion). I believe a whole lot of research would already be available that examines different ways of expressing political dissent, which of those ways have proven more useful than others, and what are the advantages and limitations of each of the ways in which people have raised their voices in recent past.
I believe tools of natural/social scientific and historical research can provide useful bases for ongoing legislation, just as humanly-conceived juristic tools (qiyās, istiḥsān, istiṣlāḥ, sadd al‑dharī‘ah etc.) of the past did. We need to explore and exploit the potential of contemporary research tools in informing policy and guiding legislation in matters that are not specifically addressed by Qur'an and authentic records of the Messenger's practice. Human solutions based on rigorous research are more likely to be useful than marginally Islamic views that result from stretching Qur'an and ḥadīth too far.
