When I first came across the proposals of Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) for a “model” women’s protection bill, I thought I would just ignore it and remain focused on the more urgent things in my own life. I changed my mind when I read Khalid Zaheer sb’s post in which he (too) elaborates when a man may hit his wife. I was disappointed and I thought I had to pen down my thoughts.
The anachronism and absurdity of other proposals deserves our attention too, but I will restrict myself to CII’s recommendation that “a husband may, when needed, lightly beat his wife.”
CII, respected Khalid Zaheer sb, and others would justify or give an apologist explanation for the alleged permission by making reference to Qur’an 4:34. The verse permits men fearing nushūz from their wives to “advise them, not sleep with them, and/or hit them.”
Aside from the difficulty in interpreting nushūz that seriously limits the applicability of this portion of the verse, the misconception that Qur’an allows men of our time to hit their wives is based on a fundamentally flawed assumption: That all verses of Qur’an are applicable in all times and places! That the entire text of Qur’an is universal and absolute in its applicability.
In this post, I will argue that a certain kind of Qur’anic verses, including 4:34, work only in relation to their spatial and temporal cultural context. While they remain instructive in some ways, they do not (fully) apply in all times and places. In fact, the more you attend to their immediate context, the harder it gets to justify their applicability in other settings. These verses are relative and contingent and their application limited to their immediate circumstances. For most practical purposes, they belong in history.
Sadly, well-meaning scholars of the past and the present have often stripped the contingent verses of Qur’an of their context and suggested continued applicability out of their desire to continually derive guidance from God’s word. This is why CII can’t admit that physical disciplining of one’s wife is a thing of the past and Khalid Zaheer sb has difficulty saying that a man may not be allowed to beat his wife under any circumstances in 21st-century Pakistan.
So what is universal and what is contingent in Qur’an? What is absolute and what is relative?
Human beings relate with the metaphysical propositions of Qur’an independent of the realities of their time and space. Thus, God is one, whether you are born in 7th-century Arabia or 21st-century North America. That we will be held accountable for the kind of lives we have lived and admitted to the garden or the fire is as true today as it was in the time of Moses and Pharaoh.
Similarly, the general ethical principles outlined in Qur’an apply as much today as they did in the past. Truthfulness is a virtue in Asia as well as Africa. Striving for justice and caring for the weak is as desirable today as it was in the time of Jesus.
These metaphysical and general ethical propositions of Qur’an constitute the universal dimension of the Arabic proclamation.
On the other hand, specific instructions relating to specific circumstances and situations cannot be isolated from their context. They are necessarily tied to a certain segment of human history. They cannot (and they are not meant to) be applied to other settings and other peoples without regard to the peculiarities of their own time and space. The specific ordinances of Qur’an are really archives of what was happening at the time and how God and the messenger dealt with it. They are contingent. They are relative. They remain insightful and instructive, but readers of Qur’an may not be able to observe them literally in a different time and place. In fact, literal adherence to some of these texts could very well run contrary to the spirit of Qur’an.
What I have suggested here is not new. In Islamic history, we see numerous instances of departure from the text of Qur’an (and the prophet’s example) as the spatial and temporal reality of believers changed.
The second caliph ‘Umar, for example, is known to have suspended the Qur’anic instruction to amputate the hand of a thief in view of the economic reality in his time. He is also known to have departed from the prophet’s practice in distributing the spoils of war. He reserved conquered land for the state so that individual warriors don’t turn into feudal lords.
The Ḥanafī principle of istiḥsān (juristic preference) also entails departure from an obvious analogy or qiyās to arrive at a solution that is more in line with the demands of justice. The historical discussions of maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah (objectives of law) sought to identify overarching concerns of the Qur’anic discourse so as to guide the Islamic juristic practice in matters where literal adherence to the text was not helpful.
These examples show that early Muslims did not think that literal adherence to foundational Islamic texts was always required of them. People like ‘Umar Ibn Khaṭṭāb, Abū Ḥanīfah and his earliest disciples had imbibed the Qur’anic spirit, and confidently made their call as khulafā’ of God whenever needed. They upheld the spirit of Qur’an, not always the letter.
In our own times, people resort to scientific calculations of astronomical dawn, or when the sun is 16 or 15 degrees below the horizon, and not their ability to distinguish between black and white threads (as Qur’an proposes) to begin fasting in the morning.
Qur’an prescribes a procedure for recording the transaction when a person borrows money from another: have a scribe write down the transaction in the presence of two witnesses; if two male witnesses are not available, have one male and two female witnesses so if one of the women forgets, the second would remind her; follow the procedure whether the transaction is small or large, for it helps establishing testimony should a confusion arise (2:282–283). Yet the most observant of Muslims are comfortable with having a mere electronic record of the transaction – an email exchange may be. It is because we believe electronic records are convenient and often more reliable than having a scribe write down a transaction in the presence of two witnesses.
These are instances of departure from literal observance of the Qur’anic text warranted by availability of better means. We do it. And we know it is alright. Yet the Council of Islamic Ideology insists that DNA evidence may not be admissible in cases of rape! They insist that a man may beat his wife if needed.
If a friend shared with us that they are having difficulties in their marriage, who in their right mind says, “Ahan! Sounds like nushūz. Here is what Qur’an wants you to do”? No sensible Muslim, not even people identifying as ‘ulamā’ refer their loved ones to Qur’an 4:34 or 4:128. When someone reports marital discord, we share our two cents if we are close to them, and we refer them to a counselor, a wise person in the family, or an experienced and thoughtful friend. We attend to the peculiarities of their case, instead of offering them one pill that works for all.
It’s about time that we acknowledged that verses like 4:34 belong in history. That insisting on continued permissibility of men disciplining their wives is contrary to the spirit of Qur’an, just as it is offensive to say that slavery is still permissible.
Specific instructions of Qur’an pertaining to specific situations are not like a ceiling – they are more likely the baseline, the foundation upon which to build better human societies. It was not the creator’s intent to give us answers to all possible questions in Qur’an. With its core universal teachings, the word of God seeks to cultivate an ethical consciousness, with which we navigate the world. Confronted with an infinite number of new situations, we are expected to use our best judgment and make our call as khulafā’ of the creator, as custodians of God’s world, instead of stretching Qur’an and other Islamic texts beyond their spatial and temporal contexts and making a mockery of religion.